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Stephen R. Brown 
I. INTRODUCTION 
  In 2019, Montana produced nearly twenty-three million barrels of 
crude oil, up slightly from its 2018 production,1 and 48.5 million cubic 
feet of natural gas.2 Through mid-2020, both crude oil and natural gas 
production declined by more than 25% when compared to the same 




 1. Crude Oil Production, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_crd_crpdn_adc_mbbl_a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/TE2B-ZXBB]. 
 2. Montana Natural Gas Withdrawals, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9010mt2a.htm [https://perma.cc/768H-SFLV]. 
 3. See Montana Field Production of Crude Oil, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MCRFPMT2&f=
M [https://perma.cc/JYT8-EBNK] (displaying the annual crude oil production and 
the decrease in crude oil production through June 2020); See U.S. natural gas 
production (gross withdrawals), U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/production/#ng-tab [https://perma.cc/N9ZU-
M3LV] (follow: tab option on the screen to “Montana”) (indicating the decrease in 
natural gas production). 
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II. MONTANA SUPREME COURT 
  The Montana Supreme Court only decided one oil and gas case in 
the last year—Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC. However, it was 
relatively significant because it clarified the test used in Montana to 
determine what is included in a grant or reservation of “other 
minerals.” 
A. Background 
  Beginning in 2005, Mary Ann and Lige Murray discovered 
several unique dinosaur fossils on their ranch in eastern Montana. The 
fossils included the remains of two dinosaurs locked in combat, a 
nearly complete Tyrannosaurus rex, and several intact Triceratops 
parts. Each fossil has significant scientific and financial value. 
The Murrays own all of the surface estate on their property but only 
a minority interest in the mineral estate. The mineral estate was split 
from the surface estate in a mineral deed that stated, “[a]ll right title 
and interest in and to all of the oil, gas, hydrocarbons, and minerals in, 
on and under, and that many be produced from [the described 
property] . . . .”4 Two entities, including BEJ Minerals, LLC (“BEJ”), 
ultimately owned the majority of the mineral interest. A dispute arose 
when the Murrays notified the other mineral interest owners of the 
fossil finds, as they were required to do under the terms of the purchase 
contract for their ranch. BEJ claimed the fossils fell within the 
definition of “minerals” under the terms of the deed and were not part 
of the Murrays’ surface estate interest. (BEJ did not dispute that the 
Murrays owned a minority share of the mineral interest.) The Murrays 
disagreed and filed suit in Montana state district court seeking a 
declaratory judgment that the fossils were part of the surface estate. 
  The Murrays’ filing started a long procedural journey for the 
dispute. BEJ removed the case to federal court based on diversity. The 
federal district court ruled that the dinosaur fossils were part of the 
surface estate.5 BEJ appealed, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed, finding that fossils were not part of the surface estate. 6 The 
 
 4. Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 464 P.3d 80, 81 (Mont. 2020). 
 5. Murray v. Billings Garfield Land Co., 187 F. Supp. 3d 1203 (D. Mont. 
2016), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 908 F.3d 437 
(9th Cir. 2018), on reh’g en banc, 924 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2019), certifying question 
to, 2020 MT 131, 400 Mont. 135, 464 P.3d 80. 
 6. Murray v. BEJ Minerals, 908 F.3d 437, 447–48 (9th Cir. 2018), on reh’g en 
banc, 924 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2019), certifying question to, 464 P.3d 80. 
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Murrays asked for en banc review, which the Ninth Circuit granted.7 
As reported in the update last year, due to important public policy 
ramifications for Montana,8 the Ninth Circuit then certified to the 
Montana Supreme Court the question of whether dinosaur fossils fall 
within the scope of the term “minerals” when used in a mineral 
reservation. In Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, the Montana Supreme 
Court held they do not. 
The Montana Supreme Court articulated and applied a three-factor 
test to provide the necessary “contextual cues” as to whether “a 
substance fits within the ordinary and natural meaning of ‘mineral.”9 
First, the Court examined the scope of the term “minerals” as used in 
the deed and whether dinosaur fossils fit within the term. Next, the 
Court evaluated whether the mineral composition of the material 
makes it rare and valuable. Finally, the Court looked to the relationship 
to and effect on the surface when the material is removed. This three-
factor test had not previously been used in Montana to evaluate the 
term “mineral” in a deed or reservation.10 
B. Majority Opinion 
  The Court spent the majority of its analysis on the first factor, 
seeking to determine the mutual intent of the parties when they drafted 
the deed as is required by Montana statute.11 The Court applied this 
factor in a general sense because there was no indication in the factual 
record that the parties specifically contemplated ownership of 
dinosaur fossils when they drafted the mineral deed.12 The Court noted 
that the materials specifically mentioned in the deed (oil, gas, and 
hydrocarbons) typically are “mined for further refinement and 
economic exploitation” while fossils are not.13 The Court then 
surveyed several Montana statutes that define the term “mineral” for 
various permitting and reclamation purposes. Although these 
definitions refer to various examples, none mention fossils. The Court 
 
 7. Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 920 F.3d 583, 584 (9th Cir. 2019) (order 
granting en banc). 
 8. Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 924 F.3d 1070, 1071–72 (9th Cir. 2019) (en 
banc). 
 9. Murray, 464 P.3d at 84. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 84–90; MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-3-301 (2019). 
 12. Murray, 464 P.3d at 87. 
 13. Id.  
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then identified several instances in Montana statutes where fossils are 
mentioned but only in a non-economic sense.14 
The Court also visited its decision in Carbon County v. Union 
Reserve Coal Co., where it held that coal seam gas was not within the 
scope of the terms “coal and coal rights” when used in an instrument.15 
The Court noted with approval that under Carbon County and the 
maxim expression unius est exclusion alterius,16 the grant of specific 
minerals (i.e. coal and coal rights) does not imply the grant of all 
minerals.17 Based upon all these interpretive tools, the Court 
concluded that in the context of a “general mineral reservation deed,” 
the “language identifying ‘mineral’ would not ordinarily and naturally 
include fossils.”18 
Even though it arguably could have finished its analysis with its 
conclusion that fossils are not minerals in this type of deed, the Court 
proceeded to its second factor. The Court found that the “rarity and 
value of dinosaur fossils” is “not a circumstance of their mineral 
composition and consequent usefulness for refinement and economic 
exploitation.”19 This factor therefore supported the conclusion that 
fossils are not minerals. As precedent, the Court looked to two 
Montana cases, where it previously ruled that substances that are 
“minerals” in a scientific sense are not minerals for purposes of a 
general reference in an instrument, primarily because they are too 
common. The first involved the use of scoria for roadbuilding 
material.20 The second involved sandstone that did not have to be 
“changed, refined, or processed to be used commercially.”21 Both 
cases in turn relied on the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Heinatz 
v. Allen22—a 1949 case holding that limestone ordinarily is not a 
mineral. In Heinatz, the Texas Supreme Court reasoned that: 
 
substances such as sand, gravel and limestone are not 
minerals within the ordinary and natural meaning of the 
word unless they are rare and exceptional in character 
 
 14. Id.  
 15. Carbon Cty. v. Union Reserve Coal Co., 898 P.2d 680, 688 (Mont. 1995). 
 16. As defined by the Court, “the expression of one thing is the exclusion of 
another,” Id. 271 Mont. at 466, 898 P.2d at 684. 
 17. Murray, 464 P.3d at 86. 
 18. Id. at 90. 
 19. Id. at 92. 
 20. Farley v. Booth Bros. Land & Livestock Co., 890 P.2d 377, 378–79 (Mont. 
1995). 
 21. Hart v. Craig, 216 P.3d 197, 198 (Mont. 2009). 
 22. Heinatz v. Allen, 217 S.W.2d 994, 995 (Tex. 1949). 
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or possess a peculiar property giving them special 
value, as for example sand that is valuable for making 
glass and limestone of such quality that it may 
profitable be manufactured into cement.23  
 
In applying this factor, the Murray Court did not focus on the 
“character” or “particular property” of dinosaur fossils but instead on 
whether the material has a composition that can be usefully refined 
and exploited economically. The Court concluded fossils do not, and 
therefore they are not rare and exceptional. 
  The Murray Court’s final factor looked to how dinosaur fossils 
relate to the surface of the land and the “method and effect” of 
removing them.24 The Court concluded that because fossils are 
“excavated” from the ground and not “mined,” they are similar to the 
limestone at issue in Heinatz. Therefore, the Court weighed against 
interpreting the fossils to be “minerals” within the scope of the deed.25 
C. Dissenting Opinion 
  Three justices dissented. They concluded that because dinosaur 
fossils met the scientific definition of “mineral,” all that is left is a 
determination of whether the fossils have rare and exceptional 
qualities. The dissent then argued that the focus should be on these 
particular fossils, not fossils in general. Because it is “abundantly clear 
these fossils are rare, exceptional, and valuable,” the dissent concluded 
that Montana law dictates that they must be “minerals” as that term 
was used in the deed.26 The dissent strongly disagreed with the 
majority’s addition of the surface destruction factor, arguing it lacked 
any precedential basis.27 
D. Analysis 
Based on the first factor, the Court gave a well-reasoned analysis of 
why dinosaur fossils do not fall within the accepted use of the term 
“minerals.” The Murray Court thoroughly reviewed Montana statutes, 
case law, and regulatory interpretations to ultimately conclude the 
term “minerals” when used in a deed “would not ordinarily and 
 
 23. Id. at 997. 
 24. Murray, 464 P.3d at 92. 
 25. Id. at 92. 
 26. Id. at 99. 
 27. Id. 
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naturally include fossils.”28 At that point, the Court could have ended 
its inquiry because if fossils are not “minerals” as commonly 
understood, there was no reason to conduct an inquiry into whether 
the fossils are “rare and valuable” or can be collected without 
disturbing the surface. The Court’s analysis of the second and third 
factors arguably raises more question than it answers. 
Ending the inquiry at fossils not being minerals arguably would not 
conflict with Montana precedent. If the scoria and sandstone at issue 
in the prior Montana cases were filtered through the Court’s “ordinary 
and natural” usage analysis, they both would technically be minerals, 
which then justifies the additional inquiry of whether either had some 
particular property that differentiated them from other scoria, 
sandstone, or common materials. The Texas Supreme Court followed 
this approach in Heinatz when it concluded that limestone could be a 
“mineral” under an instrument in some instances but was not in that 
particular case because it had no use other than as common building 
material.29 
The prior Montana cases and the Texas court in Heinatz indicate 
that the analysis moves to the “rare and valuable” step after a finding 
that a material is a mineral but is more like soil or construction 
material, thereby justifying further inquiry.30 Additionally and 
somewhat analogously, under the Surface Resources Act, the United 
States recognizes uncommon varieties of certain minerals when the 
mineral deposit has some property giving it “distinct and special 
value.”31 
  Unfortunately, the Montana Court strays from these cases by its 
focus on what can be refined and economically exploited from the 
mineral composition of the material. The Court seems to have tried to 
make the test fit the facts, which inadvertently could cause some 
materials to not be minerals when they otherwise would be under the 
Heinatz line of cases. The Court cited no case where the “rare and 
valuable” or some similar test had been applied to fossils, and it does 
 
 28. Id. at 90. 
 29. Heinatz v. Allen, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (Tex. 1949). 
 30. See, e.g., Miller Land & Mineral Co. v. State Highway Com’n of Wyo., 757 
P.2d 1001 (Wyo. 1988) (gravel not part of mineral estate); Holland v. Dolese Co., 
540 P.2d 549 (Okla. 1975) (limestone); Kinney v. Keith, 128 P.3d 297 (Colo. App. 
2005) (sand and gravel); George E. Reeves, The Meaning of the Word Minerals, 54 
N.D. L. REV. 419 (1977). 
 31. 30 U.S.C. § 611 (2012); see, e.g., Pitkin Iron Corp. v. Kempthorne, 554 F. 
Supp. 2d 1208, 1208 (D. Colo. 2008); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Anderson, 629 
P.2d 512, 512 (Alaska 1981); McClarty v. Sec’y of Interior, 408 F.2d 907, 907 (9th 
Cir. 1969) (outlining 5-factor test). 
  
388 TEXAS A&M J. PROP. L. [Vol. 7 
 
not appear to have been necessary for the Court to do so here, 
especially in light of its conclusion under the first factor. 
The third factor identified by the Court is probably the most 
problematic. The Court identified no prior Montana court that relied 
on the effect of surface extraction but instead only cited Texas law as 
applied in Heinatz as precedent. However, the Court failed to 
recognize that Texas law has evolved significantly since 1949 when 
Heinatz was decided. Specifically, in Moser v. United States Steel 
Corp,32 the Texas Supreme Court rejected surface destruction as a 
factor in determining whether a substance is a “mineral” for purposes 
of a grant or reservation. Instead, the Court held that uranium, which 
may require surface destruction to extract, still may be a mineral. 
The Montana Supreme Court could have easily relied on Moser for 
its decision and reached the same result, while at the same time 
simplifying Montana law going forward.33 In Moser, the Texas Court 
looked to the “ordinary and natural meaning” of the term “mineral” 
rather than either a surface destruction test or what was known about 
the value of a mineral at the time of its severance.34 This is similar to 
the analysis used by the Montana Court in its evaluation of the first 
factor. In other words, while uranium is commonly understood to be a 
mineral, dinosaur fossils are not. No party cited any case from 
Montana or any other jurisdiction where dinosaur fossils fall within a 
generic reference to “minerals” in an instrument. 
  Ultimately, the inclusion of the surface destruction factor may 
lead Montana down a road of fewer substances being within the scope 
of the term “mineral.” For instance, if a rare mineral was discovered 
close to the surface of property, the Court’s analysis suggests it may 
not be a “mineral” reserved or granted by an instrument, even if the 
material is commonly understood as a mineral and is rare and valuable 
if its extraction destroys the surface. 
  The surface destruction factor also leads to potential confusion 
because it forces a fine distinction between the “surface estate” and 
the “surface of the land.” Montana recognizes that the surface estate 
may include aspects of property, such as pore space thousands of feet 
below the physical surface of the land.35 Essentially, the surface estate 
 
 32. Moser v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984). 
 33. The Montana Supreme Court previously has cited Moser with approval in a 
decision holding that pore space is part of the surface estate, not the mineral estate. 
Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co., LP v. Lang & Sons, Inc., 259 P.3d 766, 770 (Mont. 
2011). 
 34. Moser, 676 S.W.2d at 102. 
 35. Burlington, 259 P.3d at 770. 
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is everything that is not part of the mineral estate. If destruction of the 
surface estate is a component of determining whether something is 
part of the surface estate, it would potentially lead to a circular 
analysis. The Montana Supreme Court potentially raised this concern 
by incorrectly equating the terms “surface of the land” and “surface 
estate” in its analysis.36 
In a narrow sense, the Murray decision puts to rest the question in 
Montana of whether dinosaur fossils are minerals. If these fossils fail 
to meet the mineral test, it is difficult to imagine how any others ever 
could. Moreover, the Montana Legislature has, at least prospectively, 
removed any ambiguity by legislating that fossils are not minerals 
unless specifically mentioned in a deed.37 However, by expanding the 
rare and valuable factor beyond its traditional use as a test for 
widespread mineral materials, and by adding a surface destruction 
factor that has fallen out of favor in other states, the Court may have 
unnecessarily added some uncertainty when determining the scope of 
a grant or reservation of “minerals,” which ultimately may make title 
examination in Montana less certain. 
III. FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT OF MONTANA 
A. Wildearth Guardians v. United States Bureau of Land 
Management 
  Wildearth Guardians (“Wildearth”) challenged the United States 
Bureau of Land Management’s (“BLM”) decision to issue 287 oil and 
gas leases covering 145,063 acres of land in Montana. Wildearth 
contended that the BLM’s decision to issue the leases in late 2017 and 
early 2018 violated various requirements of the National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). A Montana federal district court 
agreed and vacated the leases.38 
  NEPA requires that federal agencies comply with several 
procedural obligations before making decisions that may significantly 
affect the quality of the human environment.39 One of these 
 
 36. E.g., Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 464 P.3d 80, 92 (Mont. 2020) 
(references to “land surface” and “surface estate”). 
 37. MONT. CODE ANN. § 1–4–112 (2019) (“When used in any instrument, unless 
the clear and express terms of the instrument provide otherwise, the term “minerals” 
does not include fossils”). 
 38. Wildearth Guardians v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 2020 WL 2104760, at 
*13 (D. Mont. May 1, 2020). 
 39. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012). 
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obligations requires agencies to take a “hard look” at potential 
environmental impacts. The BLM oil and gas leasing process is a set 
of decisions subject to NEPA. The plaintiffs in this case asserted that 
BLM failed to meet its NEPA obligations when it sold leases in several 
planning areas in Montana. 
  The court identified several NEPA violations. First, the court 
looked to several alleged impacts to groundwater from drilling and 
fracking. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the BLM failed to 
analyze the role shallow fracturing and surface casing depth would 
play in spills and the potential effects to groundwater. The court found 
no direct response to these complaints. Second, the court also found 
that the BLM failed to comply with its obligation to evaluate 
reasonable alternatives because it did not consider a measure to protect 
“all usable groundwater zones.”40 The plaintiffs suggested that this 
alternative was reasonable because it could be included in a lease 
stipulation or notice requiring groundwater testing prior to drilling. 
The court found the BLM’s proposed no surface occupancy alternative 
did not respond to this concern. 
Next, the court found that the BLM failed to meet its obligation to 
consider “cumulative impacts” because it did not look at the 
cumulative impacts to climate from the multiple lease sales. The court 
recognized that individual leases may have a negligible impact on 
climate, but “if BLM ever hopes to determine the true impact of its 
projects on climate change, it can only do so by looking at projects in 
combination with each other.”41 Lastly, the court concluded that 
because the BLM prepared deficient environmental assessments, its 
findings of no significant impact were also deficient.42 Based on these 
violations, the court held that the standard in the Ninth Circuit required 
it to vacate the leases as part of the remand to the bureau.43 
B. Montana Wildlife Federation v. Bernhardt 
  In a decision issued shortly after Wildearth Guardians, the same 
Montana federal district court judge ruled that an instructional 
memorandum issued by the BLM in 2018 violated the Federal Land 
Policy and Management Act (“FLPMA”) and therefore provided 
grounds to invalidate a number of oil and gas lease sales.44 The 
 
 40. Wildearth Guardians, 2020 WL 2104760, at *6. 
 41. Id. at *11. 
 42. Id. at *13. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Mont. Wildlife Fed’n v. Bernhardt, No. CV-18-69-GF-BMM, 2020 WL 
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FLPMA establishes the framework under which the BLM manages 
public lands within its jurisdiction. The statute requires that public 
land management protect “the quality of scientific, scenic, historical, 
ecological,” and other environmental attributes.45 BLM complies with 
this mandate by developing and implementing Resource Management 
Plans to guide its decisionmaking.46 BLM also oversees the 
competitive oil and gas leasing process on federal public lands.47 
  As part of these authorities, the BLM has undertaken a multi-state 
planning effort to protect sage grouse due to concerns regarding the 
impacts of it being listed as an endangered species. The BLM 
designated areas of sage grouse habitat to be protected and directed its 
field offices to give habitat protection priority in the oil and gas leasing 
process. In 2016, the BLM issued an instruction memorandum to 
implement this policy. 
  Following the change in administration, the BLM issued a revised 
instruction memorandum. The revised memorandum stated that the 
BLM no longer needed to prioritize sage grouse habitat in leasing 
decisions. The BLM then sold oil and gas leases based upon the 
revised memorandum. The plaintiffs challenged these decisions as 
violations of FLPMA and other statutes. The court found that the 
revised memorandum violated the BLM’s own sage grouse policy. 
The court then found that the lease sales also violated FLMPA because 
they were based upon an invalid memorandum. The court then vacated 
the lease sales. 
C. WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. v. Subsurface Easements for the 
Storage of Natural Gas 
  A Montana federal district court judge adopted the findings and 
recommendations of the United States magistrate judge as to three 
motions for summary judgment regarding condemnation of surface 
estate interests necessary to operate a natural gas storage field in 
southeastern Montana.48 The Baker Storage Field operated as a natural 
gas storage field in southeastern Montana since the 1940s. After the 
Montana Supreme Court ruled that the surface estate, not the mineral 
 
2615631, at *9–10 (D. Mont. May 22, 2020). 
 45. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8) (1982). 
 46. 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (1982). 
 47. 43 C.F.R. § 3120.3 (2019). 
 48. See WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. v. Subsurface Easements for the Storage 
of Nat. Gas in the Judith River Subterranean Geologic Formation, No. CV 18-88-
BLG-SPW, 2020 WL 4582025 (D. Mont. Aug. 10, 2020). 
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estate, owns the pore space, the project operator, WBI Energy 
Transmission, Inc. (“WBI”), had to negotiate leases with the various 
surface owners within the storage field. 
  As reported in the last update, WBI filed a condemnation action 
in federal district court under the Natural Gas Act for those properties 
where it could not successfully negotiate leases.49 The defendants 
counterclaimed based on trespass and other legal theories. The 
counterclaims were dismissed as precluded under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 71.1—the procedural rule governing condemnation 
cases.50 In subsequent rulings, the magistrate judge found that the 
surface owners failed to produce an expert witness to testify as to the 
market value of the interests condemned. The federal district court 
agreed and awarded a nominal amount of $1.00 to each defendant. 
IV. LEGISLATION 
The Montana legislature meets for its regular session biannually in 
odd numbered years.51 The legislature did not meet in 2020. 
 
 
 49. WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. v. Subsurface Easements for Storage of Nat. 
Gas in Judith River Subterranean Geological Formation, No. CV 18-88-BLG-SPW-
TJC, 2019 WL 3470742, at *2 (D. Mont. July 8, 2019).  
 50. Fed. R. Civ. P. 71.1. 
 51. MONT. CONST. art. V, § 6. 
